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Abstract:    “Financial  markets  are  given  to  excesses  and  if  a  boom/bust 
sequence progresses beyond a certain point, it will never revert to where it came 
from. Instead of acting like a pendulum, financial markets have recently acted 
more like a wrecking ball, knocking over one economy after another.”   
- A testimony before the US House Banking Committee, Sep, 1998. 
 
  There are three parts to this paper. The first part examines the time series 
behaviour  of  the  equity  indices  of  ten  countries.  Using  Robinson  (1995a)’s 
modified GPH estimator and Robinson (1994a)’s average periodogram estimator 
for the differencing parameter, we have detected that not all the financial series 
exhibit long range dependence. Non-detection of long memory lends support to 
imposition  of  policies  to  block  free  capital  flows.  The  results  suggest  that 
Indonesia has a stronger case to restrict capital flows than Malaysia. 
In the second part, we attempt to determine the degree of the contagion 
effects. This has important implications for diversification of portfolio risks as 
the  increased  co-dependence  of  asset  prices  increases  risk  in  the  short-term. 
Using correlations of equity indices across markets, we can get an indication of 
the severity of the contagion. The evidence suggests that these effects increased 
significantly and systematically as the Asian crisis worsen shortly after it started 
on 2 July 1997.  
The  third  part  discusses  the  implications  of  the  results  for  fund 
management. We argue that new regulations and hedge fund techniques have 
contributed to large capital flows that cause severe damage to economies. In the 
interim period of under-regulation of “leverage” and before the establishment of 
a new international financial architecture, adopting hedge fund’s market neutral 
or zero investment techniques may be a way to preserve Asian capital. 
  
                                                             
1 This paper was presented at the 1999 Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society held in 
Singapore in July 1999. I thank Peter M Robinson, Steve Haggard, Lam Swee Sum, Leong Siew 
Meng, Basant Kapur, Linda Low for their useful comments. The views expressed in this paper 
and mistakes remaining are entirely the author’s.    2 
1. Introduction 
“In the normal course of events, a speculative price rise provokes countervailing 
forces: supply is increased and demand reduced, and the temporary excess is 
corrected  with  the  passage  of  time.    But  there  are  exceptions.    In  foreign 
exchange,  for  example,  a  sustained  price  movement  can  be  self-validating, 
because of its impact on domestic price levels.  The same is true in the stock 
market where the performance of a stock may affect the performance of the 
company in question in a number of ways.  And in examining the recent history 
of international lending we shall find that the excessive lending first increased 
the borrowing capacity of debtor countries, as measured by their debt ratios, and 
then, when the banks wanted to be repaid, the debtor countries’ ability to do so 
evaporated.    Generally  speaking,  we  shall  find  that  the  expansion  and 
contraction of credit can affect the debtors’ ability and willingness to pay. 
 
Are these exceptions that confirm the rule, or do they necessitate a revision of 
accepted theory?  The answer depends on the frequency and severity of their 
occurrence.  If we are dealing with an isolated instance, we can treat it as a 
paradox; but if one incident follows another, we must question the theory.” 
 
  George Soros (1998) 
 
The Asian currency crisis started when Thailand was no longer able to maintain, 
and decided to abandon its fixed exchange rate regime on 2 July 1997. The effect 
caused  by  the  massive  capital  flight  and  the  duration  and  magnitude  of  the 
decline in asset prices have surprised most economists and practitioners. With 
stock prices decreased to the level of 15 years ago and exchange rates depreciated 
as much as 60% in some Asian economies, few prescriptions of economic policies, 
including IMF and World Bank’s, have helped to restore confidence in Asia.   
A few recent publications and speeches have mooted the idea of a new financial 
architecture because of the failure of countries to control large short-term capital 
flows.  Policy  makers  (Mahathir  (1998)),  academics  and  advisors  (Krugman 
(1998)), financiers and practitioners (Soros (1998)) have all contributed to the 
debate in this area. 
Soros’s view about the international financial system has not been well received 
initially but the hedge funds’ view cannot be ignored. The macro hedge funds   3 
community believes there is a global capital system with a centre and periphery 
(Soros (1998)), and that the system is inherently unstable and the effect of capital 
flow is asymmetric. With the centre as the provider of capital and the periphery 
as the user of capital, the rules of the game are skewed in favour of the centre, 
both in terms of information flow and the attraction of capital. This “centre” is 
where  the  most  active  and  mobile  part  of  the  world’s  financial  capital  is 
domiciled.  It  includes  not  only  the  international  financial  markets  like  New 
York, London, Frankfurt or Tokyo, but more important, the offshore tax havens 
which are not adequately regulated. 
This capitalist system, as they believed, is inherently flawed and excesses may be 
self-correcting at huge economic and political cost to the periphery. Using their 
belief  in  disequilibrium  and  their  expertise  in  influencing  the  fundamental 
factors of investment, they have been highly successful in their transfer of wealth 
from the periphery to the centre. The inadequacy of international regulations is 
not purely attributed to the failure to understand the so-called “reflexive” (a 
concept  introduced  by  Soros)  nature  of  credit  and  anti-regulatory  mood,  but 
mainly to the lack of appropriate international institutions.  
During the boom time, the centre provides the capital for economic expansion in 
the form of credit. An abrupt change in the willingness of the centre to provide 
capital in the form of debt instruments, bank loans, stock investment or direct 
investment,  to  the  periphery  can  cause  great  disruption  in  the  recipient 
countries. In times of uncertainty, capital tends to return to its base, which is the 
centre. This causes disproportionate disturbances to the periphery and the bust 
follows. Therefore, not only the global system is unstable; its effect on the centre 
and the periphery is asymmetric.   4 
The paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2, we provide an account 
of the Asian crisis and the motivation for the empirical work. In Section 3, we 
outline some basics about long memory or long range dependence. In Section 4, 
we  describe  the  models  and  introduce  two  methods  of  estimation  of  the 
differencing parameter. In Section 5, we discuss the choice of bandwidth and 
other smoothing numbers for practical implementation. Readers not interested 
in the technical details can skip Sections 3-5. In Sections 6 and 7, we provide 
information  on  the  sources  of  data  and  discuss  the  results.  In  Section  8,  we 
examine the links between capital controls and long memory. In Section 9, we 
look at the issue of hedge funds and leverage. In Section 10, we examine the 
correlation coefficients over a period of two years as indications of the degree of 
contagion.  In  Section  11,  we  further  discuss  the  implications  for  Asia  fund 
management. Finally, in Section 12, we conclude.  
2. The Asian Crisis 
The scope and severity of the Asian crisis that originated in Thailand in July 
1997 surprised the most pessimistic. The Pacific Century, has suddenly ended 
before the end of the century. The Asia Miracle has given way to the Asian crisis. 
The currency crisis escalated into a financial crisis, and later economic crisis. 
Kwok (1999) has mentioned that as the months went by, the crisis is also, at 
bottom, a political and social crisis. He has suggested that it is also a moral crisis, 
with the suggestion rooted in the workings of global capitalism. Both Malaysian 
Prime Minister Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad and American financier 
George  Soros  have  seen  the  need  for  some  kind  of  international  regulation. 
Capitalism is amoral, and not necessarily always rational, as the workings of the   5 
market lead to morally questionable effects, which the periphery will be more 
vulnerable to. 
Soros (1998) in his book noted the followings. The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN)  admitted  Myanmar,  a  regime  politically  and  humanely 
unacceptable to Western democracies, as a member in June 1997. Not long after, 
a number of seemingly unrelated inefficiencies and latent imbalances and their 
interaction  sparked  off  a  series  of  shocks,  whose  results  were  entirely  out  of 
proportion with the ingredients that contributed to the crisis. 
Some have argued that the deficiencies in the Asian development model were the 
culprits.  “Asian  values”  were  precisely  the  values  that  legitimised  the 
“corruption, cronyism, and nepotism” now identified as the scourge of Asian 
capitalism. These include the structural weakness of the banking system, which 
led  to  over-lending;  the  lack  of  transparency  in  ownership  of  business  and 
politics, which led to crony capitalism; and the challenge of the UN Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  the  proclaimed  superiority  of  Confucian 
capitalism, which led to less liberal economic model. However, countries in Asia 
that do not have the obvious characteristics described above also suffered along 
with their neighbours on a scale far beyond what anyone has predicted. 
The fact remains that the Asian crisis was not confined to Asia alone and it soon 
engulfed Russia, South Africa, Brazil and then Latin America. It has become 
clear that the Asian crisis cannot be explained by the reasons given above, as 
they  have  always  been  in  existence.  The  main  source  of  instability  and  the 
asymmetry can possibly be found in the inherent deficiencies in the international 
financial system itself.   6 
This led to the search for a new global financial architecture. The real problem 
lies in the excessive leverage of hedge funds and proprietary traders of large 
financial  institutions.  The  best  and  now  well  known,  Long  Term  Capital 
Management,  was  known  to  have  leveraged  40-50  times.  Proponents  for  the 
regulation and supervision of hedge funds and improved bankers’ codes believe 
that some of the damage to Asian economies had been caused by disruption from 
large and sudden capital flows. As Hong Kong Financial Secretary Donald Tsang 
noted, “To the extent that hedge funds had been the main players directing such 
private-sector fund flows, effected through their financial size and leverage, they 
were  able  to  lead  markets.”  He  added,  “The  priority  now  is  to  increase  the 
transparency  and  disclosure  of  the  exposure  of  hedge  funds,  information 
sharing… and international cooperation on monitoring hedge-fund activities are 
essential.” He has been pushing the international community to take a serious 
look at their activities and evolve mechanisms to check their excesses, without 
resorting to controls. 
When the Thai peg broke, borrowers who had assumed that the peg would hold, 
scrambled to cover their currency exposures, which was deemed too expensive to 
hedge  (much  higher  than  20%  premium)  previously.  As  Soros  (1988)  had 
predicted,  the  hedge  funds,  financial  institution’s  proprietary  traders,  mutual 
funds,  long-term  pension  funds,  and  sophisticated  high  net  worth  investors, 
realised that there were profits to be made, further aggravated the situation by 
withdrawing the capital from all the asset markets. Suddenly, there was a credit 
risk as well as currency risk, as asset values depreciated and margin calls and 
redemption set in. The credit rating agencies, bank risk management and credit 
committees, took actions that reduced the willingness of the lenders to extend   7 
existing  credit.  As  interest  rates  increase  and  as  asset  prices  depreciated,  the 
fundamentals of companies as measured by price earnings to growth ratio and 
net asset values deteriorated sparking further sell-off of equities. As the market 
capitalisation  of  each  country  shrank,  further  withdrawals  of  funds  from  the 
region  were  seen  from  asset  re-allocation  and  this  self-reinforcing  process 
resulted in a 53% decline in the Thai stock market, expressed in local currency, 
between June 1997 and the end of Jun 1998. In USD terms, this is -70%, which 
compares with an 86% loss in Wall Street between 1929 and 1933. 
The  panic  spread  across  Asia.  It  started  as  an  attack  on  the  peso,  then  the 
ruppiah  and  the  ringgit.  As  the  individual  governments  of  these  countries 
managed to a certain extent to limit the damage done to the currency, the other 
North Asia currencies came under siege. Any speeches by policy makers that 
were viewed as being in denial were perceived as signals to the traders to short 
sell the country’s currencies associated with the particular policy maker and the 
flows were intense and concentrated. No government, including Hong Kong and 
Singapore,  whose  currencies  were  previously  seen  to  be  safe  havens,  could 
withstand  the  intensity  of  the  attacks.  In  particular,  the  Singapore  currency 
depreciated together with the rest of the regional currencies against USD, rather 
than  appreciated  as  in  previous  crises.  This  immediately  aggravated  the 
situation,  as  it  was  then  obvious  that  no  country  can  withstand  the  panic  as 
competitive  devaluations  were  seen  to  be  in  process.  Rotational  plays  in  the 
region were then taking place and attacks in financial markets were seen going 
to Northeast Asia, then south and back round again. Japan’s effort in starting an 
Asian Fund was not widely supported outside Asia and that was another clear 
signal that Asian currencies would continue to depreciate without coordinated   8 
and concerted efforts to support. An uncomfortable market movement offering 
one-way bet in the form of indefensible currencies had occurred. 
Soros  used  the  wrecking  ball  example  to  describe  the  panic  and  competing 
depreciation, while others have referred this modern version of bubonic plague 
as the Asian Financial Contagion. The crisis was complex as it involved both 
currencies and credits. The credit component was further complicated with local 
and  foreign  debts.  The  debts  are  complicated  as  they  involved  many  private 
companies, some of which are politically linked. IMF was ill equipped to deal 
with the Asian crisis, as its methodology was more geared towards a contained 
currency component and public sector debts. IMF was simply not ready to deal 
with  rapid  flow  of  information  through  wired  information  agencies  such  as 
Bloomberg and Reuters, and swift flow of capital.  
IMF’s  job  was  to  prevent  a  liquidity  crisis  and  the  “structural  reform”  was 
supposedly  designed  to  address  the  underlying  fragilities,  along  with  the 
macroeconomic  policies  to  help  stabilise  the  immediate  crisis.  Besides  limited 
attempts  to  rehabilitate  weak  banking  and  corporate  sectors,  most  structural 
problems were left to the country concerned. The hedge funds, which held the 
opposite view, believed that the only solution was to convert debt into equity. 
Without  foreign  direct  investment,  relying  just  on  lending  from  IMF,  the 
structural  imbalances  would  lead  to  further  deterioration  of  confidence, 
competitive currency devaluation, higher interest rates, and asset deflation. This 
belief has its merits as indeed, the initial collapse in demand led to a steep drop 
in domestic investment, which plummeted by more than 25% in South Korea 
and Thailand, and more than 50% in Indonesia in a matter of few months. The 
sharp  depreciation  of  currencies  devastated  the  balance  sheets  of  companies,   9 
many of which had high-unhedged foreign exchange exposures. The big drop in 
investment was followed by huge withdrawal of foreign capital, rising country 
risk premiums and region-wide collapse of asset prices. The slump was worsened 
by increased precautionary savings that led private consumption to fall by more 
than income, as consumers were anticipating a prolonged recession.  
While  export  volume  went  up,  export  values  declined  as  USD  strengthened. 
Major markets for Asian exports were depressed as regional trade collapsed. 
Following  civil  unrest  and  collapse  in  the  banking  system,  production  was 
disrupted and bankruptcies set in. There was no stopping the speculators and 
traders as their confidence grew with the size of their winnings. 
China, unlike its neighbours, was not affected as much by the crisis. Similar 
problems  existed  in  the  Chinese  economy,  evidenced  in  the  collapse  of  the 
International  Trust  and  Investment  Corporations  (ITICs).  There  had  been 
tremendous  boom  in  asset  prices,  highly  leveraged  financial  institutions  with 
foreign  currency  loans,  and  deteriorating  balance  sheets  of  state-owned 
enterprises. The main difference between China and the rest of its neighbours 
was that its currency was not convertible. The saving grace for China was that 
the capital control had bought some time for the Government to act. 
This has very interesting implications, as Soros believes that the main task for 
policy makers in times like this is to slow capital flows back from the periphery 
to the centre. The most timely, direct and effective way to stop the flow in the 
short-term was to impose capital controls, thus slowing down capital flight. 
In this respect, Malaysia has imposed capital controls to prevent flow from the 
periphery to the centre. Malaysia Prime Minister Dato Seri Dr Mahathir Bin 
Mohamad  shares  the  same  view  in  that  free  market  is  not  working  and   10 
intervention  is  needed  to  restore  some  stability.  There  are  different  ways  of 
imposing  a  financial  architecture  incorporating  the  valves,  which  control  the 
speed and volume of the capital flow to and from the periphery to the centre. 
Malaysia has adopted one of the most direct methods: capital controls. Contrary 
to expectations of analysts, the controls have not sent the Malaysia economy into 
a tailspin. Instead, there were numerous improvements since the imposition of 
capital  control  on  1  Oct  1998.  With  the  local  currency  pegged  at  RM3.80  to 
USD1.00,  interest  rates  have  plunged,  exports  in  USD  terms  have  improved 
boosting foreign reserves, ailing banks are being re-capitalised, debts are being 
restructured, stockmarket has surged, car and home sales have stopped falling. 
There has not been a development of a large black market for the currency as 
predicted. In fact, with the regional currencies strengthening, some believe that 
the  ringgit  is  under-valued  vis-à-vis  the  regional  currencies.  There  are 
expectations  that  the  ringgit  may  strengthen,  because  Malaysia  needs  more 
foreign investment goods to replace depleted goods. 
The controls have worked relatively well in the short-term but the longer-term 
cost of instituting draconian measures will likely be paid in the form of slower 
foreign investment and capital injection. The verdict is not out yet as a change in 
investment rules could be enough to attract a critical mass of the typically fickle 
investment community. The fact is, financial variables have stabilised and are 
beginning to improve. We believe financial markets can be classified into two 
groups: the first group behaves like a pendulum, where the market can swing 
from one end to the other, but eventually it will return to its long-term trend; the 
second group, once disturbed, would not return to its long-term growth trend.    11 
Currency and stock markets in the first group requires no intervention from the 
relevant authority as markets have a tendency to return to its long-term growth 
trend. In the second group, intervention is required to bring the markets back to 
the long-term growth trend as there is no tendency to return to its trend. 
In the first case of series with long memory, the shocks have not altered the 
statistical process, and the market will likely return to its original growth trend. 
In the second case, shocks may have altered the underlying statistical process of 
the financial series, and the damage may not be contained. An intervention in the 
market to prevent the capital flows to the centre from the periphery is justified, 
as damage is limited by such actions. In the first case, intervention in a market 
that will eventually return to its original growth path is undesirable as the short-
term benefits would not compensate for the long-term costs of possible reduced 
investments. 
Two issues need to be researched. The first relates to whether a block is required 
to stop the flows from the periphery back to the centre and whether such a block 
is  required  for  all  countries  or  for  some.  This  paper  will  likely  raise  more 
questions  than  answers  but  it  is  an  attempt  to  show  the  weakness  of  some 
markets in terms of their defence against short-term large capital flows. Having 
established that a valve is required to block the flow of capital back to the centre 
and a new financial architecture needs to be in place, what are the implications 
for investing in Asia? The new financial architecture may still be in its infancy, 
but for fund managers and policy makers alike, capital preservation is the most 
crucial in the next few years until the structure is finally in place. As far as the 
countries  in  question,  one  solution  is  to  impose  some  form  of  a  block  in  the 
interim  period.  Obviously,  capital  controls  is  one  form.  For  fund  managers   12 
having  substantial  portion  of  their  portfolios  in  Asia,  some  form  of  capital 
preservation strategy has to be pursued. This brings us to the second issue. 
The  second  relates  to  implications  for  Asia  portfolio  management.  While 
diversification is the key word to portfolio management, one has to be concerned 
about the increase in the correlation of all markets, especially Asian markets. 
Indeed, it may be unwise to hold on to the belief that diversification is always 
good, especially if it leads to “di-worsification” as a result of the contagion effect.  
We investigate the seriousness of the contagion effect and whether it makes sense 
to invest in different countries in Asia for diversification. We suggest using the 
single period linear correlation coefficients as a form of measure of the intensity 
of the contagion effect.  
The series may possess long memory and the shock may not persist indefinitely, 
but  in  the  short-term,  having  high  correlations  for  all  Asian  markets  is  no 
comfort  to  a  fund  manager  seeking  to  diversify  his  portfolio.  Using  and 
monitoring  this  measure  of  the  intensity  of  the  contagion  effect  may  help  to 
alleviate the problems of overexposure to systematic risks. The implications of 
contagion effect for portfolio management are discussed. Readers not interested 
in the technical details may skip the next three sections and go directly to Section 
6. 
3. The Basics 
Let Xt, t = 1,2,… be a covariance stationary time series having a spectral density 
        1        ∞ 
  ƒx(λ) =   ⊯    ∑     γx(j) cosjλ,      -π < λ ≤ π       (1) 
      2π  j= −∞ 
 
where                 π 
γx(j) =  E[(X1 – E(X1))( X1+j- E(X1))] = ∫
 
    cos(jλ)ƒ(λ)dλ.    (2) 
               
_ π   13 
Xt is therefore covariance stationary so that the mean and the autocovariances 
do not depend on t. While ƒ(λ) is non-negative real valued for all λ∈(π,-π], we 
restrict our attention to the value of ƒ at the neighbourhood of λ = 0 without 
worrying about ƒ elsewhere. Consider two cases: 
(i) 0 < ƒx(0) < ∞,              (3) 
 (ii) ƒ(0) = ∞ or ƒ(0) = 0            (4) 
A series having the property (i) is an I(0) series. The simplest example of an I(0) 
series is a series of uncorrelated, homoscedastic, random variables. But empirical 
observation is sometimes consistent with models satisfying (ii), rather than (i).  
Now consider a series yt, t = 1,2,… such that 
  (1-L) 
d yt = Xt ,   t = 1,2,…          (5) 
where L is the lag operator, so Lyt = yt-1, and d is a real number. The fractional 
differencing operator d is defined by 
 
                  ∞       Γ(k-d)L
k 
  (1-L)
 d =   ∑    ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ 
       
k=0    Γ(-d) Γ(k+1) 
 
with  Γ(.)  denoting  the  gamma  function.  We  require  fy(λ)  to  satisfy  the  well 
known basic long range dependence semiparametric specification 
  ƒy(λ) ∼ Cλ
-2d, as λ → 0+,            (6) 
where C is a finite positive constant and d is the differencing parameter. The 
unknown parameter d is related to the self-similarity parameter H such that H = 
d + ½. We have the following observations: 
Characteristics    Difference    Self-Similarity    fy(λ
) 
        Parameter    Parameter    as λ → 0+ 
Antipersistent:      - ½ < d < 0  or  0 < H < ½; 
  undefined 
Pink Noise   14 
 
Short Range Dependence:        d = 0  or     H = ½;    equal to C 
White Noise 
 
Long Range Dependence:     0 < d < ½   or  ½ < H < 1;    → ∞ 
Black Noise 
 
Nonstationary:        ½ ≤ d < 1  or   1 ≤ H < 1½; 
  undefined 
 
Unit Root:            d = 1  or      H = 1 ½;    undefined 
H is usually required to lie within the interval (0,1), bounded away from its limit 
values for meaningful inferences. This is equivalent to d ∈ (-½, ½). For d ≥ ½,  fy (
λ) is not well-defined, but a suitable amount of integer differencing produces a 
covariance  stationary  time  series  in  I(d)  for  d  <  ½.  It  is  simple  to  induce 
stationarity for a series yt that is I(d) for ½ ≤ d < 1 by taking the first difference 
(1-L)yt = zt. The resulting series zt is I(d) satisfying 
  ƒz(λ) ∼ Cλ
-2d, as λ → 0+,  - ½ ≤ d < 0,          (7) 
and so fz(0) = 0. Two semiparametric estimators, outlined in the next section, are 
used  for  our  empirical  application.  By  semiparametric,  we  mean  using  the 
parametric relation (5), involving unknown parameter d and known functional 
form (1-L)
d, and then combining with the nonparametric component fy(λ). In 
terms of statistical assumptions, we need only to impose some mild regularity 
assumptions in a neighbourhood of zero frequency and condition (3).  
Delgado and Robinson (1994) have discussed various methods of estimating the 
differencing parameter d. They consider models for long memory time series in 
which  the  autocovariance  sequence  is  parameterised  at  very  long  lags  or  the 
spectral  density  is  parameterised  at  only  very  low  frequencies.  In  particular, 
instead of looking at time series as either purely stationary or non-stationary, one 
may view the series consisting of two memory components. Indeed, a series may   15 
be decomposed into a long and a short/medium memory component. For a more 
formal discussion on long and short memory processes, consider the followings 
conditions and restrictions: 
 
         ∞ 
Summability:     ∑    ⋐γj⋐ < ∞          (8) 
       
j=- 
∞ 
Boundedness:     ƒ(0) < ∞          (9) 
Covariance:      γj ≈ c j 
2d-1, as j → ∞        (10) 
Spectral Density:    ƒz(λ) ∼ Cλ
-2d, as λ → 0+.      (11) 
Most  Gaussian  models  used  in  empirical  studies  imposed  stronger  conditions 
than (8) and (9). In particular, ARMA(p,q) models requires autocovariances to 
decay exponentially as j approaches infinity and spectral density that is analytic 
at all frequencies. An ARMA specification can be used to model short/medium 
memory processes. 
Mathematically, series that violate the (8) and (9) are termed long memory. The 
ARFIMA(p,d,q) models, is a weaker class of models that violates (8) and (9), and 
yet can be shown to satisfy (10) and (11). Typically, long memory implies that 
autocorrelations decay hyperbolically with exponent exceeding –1, or that the 
spectral density increases as a power law in the neighbourhood of a singularity, 
usually at zero frequency. Strictly speaking, most financial time series exhibits 
characteristics of nonlinear models and non-Gaussianity. Unfortunately, for non-
Gaussian  processes  there  are  no  such  “global”  concepts  of  short  and  long 
memory. 
In any case, if Gaussianity is forcefully imposed and assumed correct, incorrect 
specification  of  the  autoregressive  order  p  and  moving  average  order  q  may 
affect  the  consistency  of  d  estimates.  If  p  or  q  is  misspecified,  d  may  not  be   16 
consistent. If we are interested in the long memory estimates d, and not the short 
or  medium  range  estimates  p  and  q,  it  makes  sense  to  estimate  d 
semiparametrically. In some models, the Gaussian assumption is not necessary 
for consistency but is usually required in establishing the limiting distribution. 
While there are several models proposed in the literature, we select the methods 
used based on robustness, computational advantages and ease of use. Given a 
correct,  fully  parametric  model  for  fy(λ)  at  all  frequencies,  root-N-consistent 
estimates  of  d  and  other  parameters  are  available.  In  particular,  Gaussian 
maximum  likelihood  estimates  are  not  only  root-N-consistent  but  also 
asymptotically efficient in case yt is Gaussian.  
We are aware that they are many asymptotically more efficient techniques such 
as Fox and Taqqu (1986), Dalhaus (1989), Giraitis and Surgailis (1990), Sowell 
(1992) and Robinson (1995b). Indeed, in the case of Robinson (1995b), much 
weaker assumptions than Gaussianity are imposed and it is semiparametric in 
the sense (6) is used with an approximate form of frequency domain Gaussian 
likelihood. The estimator is theoretically appealing but the main disadvantage is 
that, unlike the estimates of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983) and Robinson 
(1995a), the semiparametric “Gaussian” estimate of d is not defined in closed 
form. Though one Newton-type step (based on the ‘Gaussian’ objective function) 
from a log periodogram type estimate gives the same asymptotic efficiency as the 
‘Gaussian’ estimate. However, our proposed pooled log periodogram estimate 
probably  would  not  improve  efficiency  much.  Empirical  applications  of  the 
techniques on Singapore indices and Spanish inflation can be found in Lee and 
Robinson (1996), and Delgado and Robinson (1994) with discussions of estimator 
in Robinson (1993).    17 
The results from a paper by US Deputy Treasurer Lawrance Summers while he 
was at Harvard University more than a decade ago were interesting. Porteba and 
Summers  (1988)  have  found  that  U.S.  stock  returns  exhibit  mean  reversion 
behaviour, that is the tendency for the returns to move away from the trend, 
then reverse direction, overshooting the trend before returning to it again. Lo 
(1991), however, has found no evidence against random walk hypothesis for the 
US stock indices. We are not aware of any work done for Asian markets. 
4. The Estimators 
We exploit the large number of observations available to employ semiparametric 
procedures which are not necessary root-N-consistent, but can be justified as 
consistent in the absence of parametric model assumptions. More importantly, it 
has  practical  computational  advantage  over  other  estimators  that  require 
optimisation with the estimators not given in closed form. 
Our estimates are functions of the periodogram 
  I(λ) = (2πn)
-1 ⋐∑ yt  e
it
λ⋐
2            (12) 
We estimate I(λ) only at frequencies for λ = λk = 2πk/n, for  k = 1,…,m, where m 
< n. There are three numbers that need to be chosen by the practitioners, m, τ 
and  J.  The  integer  m  is  a  user-chosen  bandwidth  number  and  in  asymptotic 
theory, m is regarded as increasing as n tends to infinity, but at a slower rate. A 
“trimming number” τ ≥ 0 in asymptotic theory, is regarded as tending to infinity 
slower than m. The  "pooling number" J, is a small integer that stays fixed in 
asymptotic theory.  
4.1 Log-Periodogram Least Squares Estimate 
Now introduce 
         (J)                     J 
  W k   = log{ ∑   I (λk+j) } , k = τ+J, τ+2J,…..,m,      (13)   18 
            
j = 1 
 
Where we have implicitly assumed that (m-τ)/J is an integer. Now write 
      (J)      (J)                       (J) 
  W  = c     –   d (2logλk) + Uk   ,  k = τ+J, τ+2J,…m,     (14) 
 
Where c
(J) = log C + ψ (J) and ψ is a digamma function, ψ(z) = (d/dz)logΓ(z), 
where Γ is the gamma function and C being the scalar in (7).  
             ∧ 
Define d1 to be the least squares estimate of d based on the semiparametric  
regression model (14), where the Uk are the unobserved error term. 
If  τ = 0, J = 1, and we replace 2logλk by 4sin
2λk/2 
      (1)       (1)                                       (1) 
  W  = c     –   d (log(4sin
2λk/2))+ Uk  ,  k = τ+1, τ+2,…m,    (15) 
 
                      ∧                  ∧ 
We define the least square estimate of d as d0. Then, the d0 becomes the estimate 
of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983). Using the trimming to omit low frequencies 
from the regression, Robinson (1995a) showed that 
              ∧ 
  2m
1/2 (di – d )  →  N(0, Jψ’(J))      i = 0, 1.  (16) 
In the case J = 1, Jψ’(J) = π
2/6 = 1.645. The recurrence relation ψ’(J+1) = ψ’(J) – 
J
-2, indicates that the function Jψ’(J) decreases in J, taking values 1.289 at J = 2 
and 1.185 at J = 3 and tending to 1 as J→∞. Furthermore, it can be deduced that 
the usual large-sample interpretation of regression t-ratios applies in this case, 
which means that one can use the standard regression t-test for d. 
          ∧ 
The major drawback of d is that yt has to be Gaussian. Thus, in the event that yt 
is  not  Gaussian,  statistical  inferences  based  on  (16)  may  well  be  invalid.  The 
following estimate, proposed separately by Robinson (1994a), is consistent even   19 
in  the  absence  of  Gaussianity.  While  it  may  be  more  robust,  the  limiting 
distribution is nonstandard for d > ¼  and normal with a complicated variance 
for d < ¼. 
4.2 Averaged Periodogram Estimate 
The averaged periodogram estimate has been shown to be consistent for d under 
mild  conditions  in  Robinson  (1994a).  This  estimate  is  based  on  the  limiting 
relationship in (11) for ƒ(λ). The advantage of using (11) instead of (10) is that 
not  all  autocovariances  are  eventually  positive.  Consider  an  average  of  the 
periodogram near zero frequency 
   ∧    m 
  F(λm) = 2πn
-1  ∑   I(λj)            (17) 
     
j=1 
 
Where  m  is  a  positive  integer  less  than  n.  Under  some  regularity  conditions 
(Robinson (1994a)) and as m → ∞ and m/n → 0 as n → ∞, that  
     ∧ 
  (1-2d)  F(λm) / C λm
1-2d   →   1    ,   as  λ → 0+      (18) 
 
indicating convergence in probability to the right hand side. For a q (0,1) chosen 
by the practitioner, we have 
     ∧ 
  (1-2d)  F(qλm) / C (qλm)
1-2d   →   1    ,   as  λ → 0+     (19) 
 
Differencing the logs of the left hand sides of (18) and (19) eliminates the scale 
factor C. Robinson (1994a) suggests the estimate 
   ∧                            ∧                  ∧ 
  d2= ½ - log(F(qλm)/F(λm))/(2logq)          (20) 
 
 
                                                     ∧   20 
Robinson (1994a) showed that d2 is consistent for d under the same conditions as 
those underlying equation (18) and including only a second moment condition on 
y. 
5. The Choice of Bandwidth 
In choosing m, we adopt simple methods although we are aware of the results of 
Delgado  and  Robinson  (1994)  and  Robinson  (1994b).  Robinson  (1994b)  has 
shown that for 0 < d < ¼, a bandwidth that asymptotically minimizes a mean 
squared error criterion is     
         1/(2 α  + 1)   2 α /(2 α + 1)         
  m = [A0/A1]               n          (21) 
 
where 
 
  A0 = (1-2d+α)
2 
    2            2α 
  A1 = E α  (2π)   (1-4d) 
 
With  
 
  f(λ)  /Cλ
-2d  = 1 + Eαλ
α + o(λ
α),   as λ → 0
+, 
 
for the largest possible α in (0,2]. We have chosen the smoothing parameter α = 
2, and Eα = 2. We also employ the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth m = n
1/2, usually 
about three or four times smaller than (21). We also report the t test statistics for 
d = 0, which corresponds to the null that there is no long memory in the first 
difference of the logged stocks. The null is rejected when absolute value of t is 
significantly larger relative to the normal distribution. 
For d1 estimate, we reported results for J = 1,2,…,10, and τ = 1,2,…,10 with the 
optimal  bandwidth  and  the  rule-of-thumb  bandwidth.  However,  rather  than 
focussing confining our discussions to results using these “optimal” bandwidths   21 
and selected J’s and τ’s only, we decided to be broader and cover the results 
using a range of bandwidth for d2 estimate.  
6. Data 
All the daily data are obtained from the Bloomberg unadjusted. These are the 
data watched by investors of large institutions on a real time basis and most of 
the allocation and buy/sell recommendations are based on reports that rely on 
these data. We collected the data as far back as possible for each series (see Table 
1). Define Pt the stock index at time t. We shall apply the methods of previous 
section to the returns yt = log(Pt/Pt-1). We have stock indices for 10 countries 
starting from beginning of Jan 75 to June 1998, depending on the availability of 
the data from source. The number of observations ranges from 2491 for Taiwan 
to 5962 for US.  
We have also split the sample into two sub-periods, with period 1 from  2 Oct 
1989 to 2
 Jul 1997 and period 2 from 3 Jul 1997 to 30 Jun 1998. The motivation 
for splitting the sample into Period 1 and Period 2 is to capture the Asia Growth 
period in the 1990’s for Asia and the Asian Contagion period from Jul 1997. The 
results for the sub-periods are not reported in this paper as the main conclusions 
are  not  changed  and  they  add  little  value  in  our  following  discussions.  Lo 
(1991)’s  augmented  rescaled  range  test  was  also  applied  to  the  data  but  the 
conclusion is not changed and results are not reported here. The markets we 
covered in the study included Singapore (STI), Hong Kong (HSI), USA (INDU), 
Indonesia (JCI), Korea (KOSPI), Malaysia (KLCI), Japan (NKY), Philippines 
(PCOMP), Thailand (SET), and Taiwan (TWSE).   22 
7. Results 
We have reported the results for stock market indices for 10 countries covering 
25 years from 1975 to 1998 in the first version of the paper. We have results for 
the d1 estimates with the corresponding J = 1,..,10  and τ =1,…,10 (a total of a 100 
estimates).  We  also  use  m  =  n
1/2  and  the  optimum  bandwidth  of  (21).  These 
results are not reported but available from the author. We particularly look at 
the cases where the ⊮d1⊮> 0.1 and two-sided test statistics (null hypothesis is no 
long memory) significant at the 10% level. Non rejection of the null does not 
imply that the null is true and it simply means that we have not detected any 
presence of long memory. The proportion of rejections out of the 100 estimates 
would give us an indication of the likelihood of the presence of long memory. The 
proportions corresponding to two different bandwidths are reported in Table 
2.1.  
Having long memory (d > 0) in the series implies that the market would return to 
its long-term trend sometime in the future, but it may not get all the way back 
there. Having no long memory (d = 0) in the series implies that the market would 
not return to its long-term trend ever and if it did, it is by chance. This would 
provide some justifications, though not conclusively, for the policy makers to act. 
Most of the significant estimates are positive indicating that if a one-sided test is 
conducted  and  the  null  is  rejected,  the  series  are  likely  to  have  long  range 
dependence. 
We can also look at how much long memory we have in the series. By looking at 
the  proportion  of  the  coefficients  lying  outside  [-0.1,  0.1]  with  test  statistics 
greater than the critical value at 10% level of significance, we can have an idea of 
how “White” the noise is. We can see that for the two developed markets, US and   23 
Japan, the results seem to suggest that these two markets are fairly efficient and 
the random walk hypothesis may not be rejected. However, not all the Asian 
markets  are  efficient  and  exhibit  random  walk  behaviour.  For  some  Asian 
markets, namely, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the null seems generally 
not  rejected  most  of  the  time  implying  market  prices  (not  returns)  exhibit 
random walk behaviour.  
Would trading volume make any difference to the results? In terms of trading 
volume or liquidity of the three markets, Indonesia is the least liquid, followed by 
Malaysia  and  Hong  Kong.  While  some  have  argued  that  liquidity  may  be  a 
source that would bias the results for individual stocks, the index itself is not 
subject to such criticism. There are therefore some justifications for the policy 
makers in these countries to act against the flow of capital back to the centre. 
Rather than reporting the results in a table, we plot the results for d2 estimate for 
500 different bandwidth starting from m = n
1/2. Here, the summary statistics of 
the bandwidth are reported below the Figures 1(a) to 1(j) for comparison. In 
particular, we seek to answer the question of when the long memory effect is the 
strongest corresponding to m. The summary statistics are reported in Table 2.2. 
We concentrate on markets that exhibit long memory behaviour. The maximum 
estimates for series exhibiting long memory lie in the range [.1525, .1823]. The 
corresponding m’s lie in the range [15, 287]. Taiwan market has the shortest 
cycle of  “long memory” with m=15 and Thailand has the longest cycle of “long 
memory” with m = 287.  
8. Capital Controls and Long Memory 
It would be difficult to draw firm conclusions from the results. However, it is 
clear that emerging markets such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Hong Kong do not   24 
have  strong  trend-reinforcing  characteristics  as  other  neighbours.  In  other 
words, if there are shocks to the system, it is unlikely that the markets would 
return to their long-term trend. If the market were any indication of the real 
economy, then any shock would push the original growth projection away from 
the potential long-term path, to which it is unlikely to return. 
Since  the  imposition  of  capital  controls  in  Malaysia  in  1998,  a  number  of 
dissident voices noted the openness of the capital account. But orthodox policy 
views concerning the openness of the capital account generally prevailed. Since 
the Asian financial crisis, the consensus in the economics profession regarding 
the  wisdom  of  controls  began  to  fray.  Bhagwati  (1998)  and  Krugman  (1998) 
made the case for capital controls as a way of managing small open developing 
economies.  Shortly  after  the  publication  of  some  of  these  views,  Malaysia 
reversed its orthodox stabilisation and structural reform policy that was initiated 
by the former Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Datuk Seri Anwar 
Ibrahim.  Malaysia  started  deviating  from  policies  thought  to  be  IMF’s 
prescriptions. Clearly, in terms of the practical implementation, political issues 
and events have taken over economic debates.  
A detailed discussion of the political economy of capital controls is beyond the 
scope of this paper. For the case of Malaysia and its neighbours, Haggard and 
Low (1999) have covered some of the more important issues. The success and 
failure of controls in Malaysia will influence the debates on costs and benefits for 
small economies of the domestic market’s close integration with the international 
financial system. 
Mahathir’s efforts in severing an informal and extensive financial integration 
between  Singapore  and  Malaysia  has  been  successful,  shutting  the  Ringgit   25 
offshore market and the CLOB International, a Singapore second board that 
traded in over 100 Malaysian shares. 
We  do  not  attempt  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  the  Malaysia’s  capital 
controls will constitute an interim strategy that other countries should emulate. 
This will depend on the preliminary evidence Malaysia’s controls have produced. 
But the results so far have been encouraging. The list of supporters has grown 
over  time.  Supporters  of  the  impositions  have  included  the  United  Nations 
Development  Programme,  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development,  the  Japanese  Deputy  Vice  Minister  Eisuke  Sakaribara,  and 
Japan’s Federation of Economics and Business Association, Keidanren. 
On 27 Feb 1999, in a foreign policy speech to three public affairs groups in San 
Francisco, US President Bill Clinton noted that a solution is needed to facilitate 
the movement of money that could avoid these dramatic economic cycles of boom 
and then bust. According to him, the need for change was acute because huge 
capital flows that surged in and out of emerging economies have bankrupted 
developing  countries.  An  earlier  held  view  that  countries  should  stick  to  re-
structuring first as fundamentals would eventually determine asset prices and 
currency values, have now taken a backseat and given way to reforming the 
global financial systems. 
While top industrial nations have joined efforts to revamp world financial rules 
after the global crisis, the Clinton administration have rejected proposals that 
would place more stringent controls on the movement of investor capital across 
borders.  
Our  results  suggest  that  if  Malaysia  is  successful  in  its  effort  to  revive  and 
restructure  its  economy,  Indonesia  should  follow  the  actions  of  Malaysia.   26 
Indonesian President B.J. Habibie has moved to distinguish himself from the 
Malaysia Prime Minister since the imposition of the controls. Indonesia’s central 
bank has argued that it will be too complex for Indonesia to implement the same 
controls  as  in  Malaysia,  contending  that  the  floating  exchange  rate  system  is 
more practical and efficient. Clearly, one needs to address the constraints of the 
IMF programmes, the political muscles and a competent administrative service 
to carry out similar policy course. Notwithstanding this, our results are biased 
towards the implementation of a system that blocks or slows large reverse short-
term capital flows. 
In  Aug  1998,  US  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Alan  Greenspan  orchestrated  a 
private bailout of Long Term Capital Management after the crisis in Russia. The 
main  reason  cited  was  the  supposedly  USD1  trillion  market  positions  that 
potentially posed severe risks to the global financial system. There were some 
signs that the centre was also vulnerable to events in the periphery. 
9. Hedge Funds and Leverage 
LTCM was an absolute anomaly among hedge funds due to the extent of its 
leverage, which was apparently more representative of some institutional trading 
desks than of hedge funds. While new regulations governing lending to hedge 
funds  seems  likely,  it  probably  will  have  little  impact  on  the  world  of  hedge 
funds.  
Several testimonies to the House Committee on Banking and Finance recently 
have  perhaps  thrown  some  lights  on  the  hedge  funds  activities.  The 
announcement of the Hong Kong Government identifying four hedge funds as 
“speculators” on the Hong Kong exchange and HK dollar in Aug 1998 has also 
indicated that the larger and highly-leveraged hedge funds, together with the   27 
proprietary  desks  of  major  institutions  contributed  to  the  volatility  of  the 
market. 
Towards the end of 1998, redemptions from hedge funds were unusually high at 
10%. At the end of Nov 1998, emerging US hedge funds and emerging offshore 
hedge funds were recording negative returns of –40.7% and –23.6% respectively 
compared to the overall total return of different hedge fund styles of 7.4% and –
3.2%  for  US  and  offshore  funds.  In  particular,  short  selling  hedge  funds 
returned  a  negative  12.4%.  However,  offshore  aggressive  growth  and  market 
timing returned 20.1% and 16.5% respectively. Macro hedge funds and market 
neutral  –  securities  hedging  returned  6.8%  and  7.4%  respectively.  This  is 
contrary to what most believe that hedge funds are the main culprit as a group. 
Although we cannot be sure how many funds have been hurt by the reversal in 
markets in Asia, there are others that possibly have good returns. 
It is unknown how many hedge funds are there in the world but Van Hedge 
Fund Advisors International, Inc., covers 4100 (13 different styles) hedge funds 
with  USD140  billion  in  assets.  It  is  unclear  if  the  hedge  funds  and/or  the 
proprietary desks are the main forces in initiating large capital flows but highly 
leveraged funds and derivatives can cause wide fluctuation in asset prices. On 29 
Jan 1999, the 10-country Basle Committee on Banking Supervision asked banks 
to tighten their lending standards to hedge funds. The Committee also suggested 
that  banks  better  tailor  their  demands  for  collateral  and  margin  to  the  risk 
profile of hedge funds, indicating “leverage” and the use of derivatives may be 
the main culprit. The US President’s Working Group on Financial Markets is 
examining the activities of hedge funds in the wake of LTCM.   28 
In  the  context  of  portfolio  management,  and  in  the  interim  period,  guarding 
against large reverse capital flows is a major and crucial task. This is especially 
important as implied by the results, that some markets are not likely to return to 
its  long-term  trend.  The  assumption  of  continuous  growth  can  no  longer  be 
assumed.  No  matter  what  the  investment  horizon  is,  changes  in  short-term 
correlations in non-trend reversal markets have important implications even for 
long-term funds. 
10. Correlations and The Contagion Effect 
Tables 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2 reported the correlation coefficients of the 10 markets 
for the period Jul 1996 to Jun 1998. We split the samples into Jul 96-Jun97 and 
Jul 97-Jun 98. The selected results for the first period are reported in Tables 3.1 
and 4.1 and the second period in Tables 3.2 and 4.2. Using Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we 
can examine the selected monthly correlation coefficients. For Tables 4.1 and 4.2, 
we have the rolling three-month correlation coefficients. Splitting the data into 
two periods allows us to examine the changes in the correlations before and after 
July 1997, the start of the Asian crisis (full results are available from the author). 
It is particular interesting to note the changes in the correlation coefficients for 
markets such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Hong Kong. In Oct 1996, most of the 
markets were not moving in tandem but in opposite directions. Indonesia was 
negatively  correlated  with  4  out  of  the  9  markets,  Malaysia  was  negatively 
correlated with 7 out of the 9 markets, and Hong Kong was negatively correlated 
with 6 out of the 9 markets. As the crisis broke out in Jul 1997, the correlations 
change abruptly. 
By Oct 1997, there were no correlation coefficients recording less than +0.699 
with any of these three markets. For Hong Kong, the minimum coefficient was   29 
0.818,  indicating  that  all  markets  were  moving  in  tandem  with  Hong  Kong. 
Similarly, Malaysia and Indonesia markets were also moving closely with the 
rest. 
One  may  argue  that  single  month  correlations  were  too  volatile  to  draw  any 
conclusions.  Indeed,  investment  committees  usually  meet  every  quarter,  after 
which  the  re-balancing  of  portfolios  is  being  done.  It  is  therefore  more 
appropriate to examine the three months correlations. The results give similar 
picture.  By  Oct  1997,  there  were  no  negative  coefficients,  indicating  that  the 
herd-like behaviour was contagious. 
Large  reverse  capital  flows  had  caused  all  the  markets  moving  in  the  same 
direction making it a one-way bet for speculators and investors alike. Initially, 
the correlations were not strong. But as the crisis deepens, the profits of market 
timers were accumulating and bigger bets were placed. On the one hand, there 
was a group of investors whose feeling of “fear” got stronger as the negative 
events unfolded. On the other hand, there was another group of market-timers 
that grew in confidence and felt “superior”. These “feelings” were contagious 
and it would quickly spread across Asia, inflicting damages to the markets and 
economies. The herd behaviour accelerated the sell-off with increased outflows of 
capital from the Asian markets.  
As seen in the changes in the correlation coefficients, once the contagion effect 
had reached its “peak”, it subsided temporarily. Some genuine investors would 
have been sidelined by then and market-timers continued with the activities until 
the  next  wave  of  “fear”  and    “superior”  feelings  resurfaced  again.  This  is 
demonstrated by the coefficients that drop substantially before picking up again.   30 
There  would  be  a  point  where  “saturation”  was  reached  and  almost  all  the 
market participants were from a small group of highly leveraged market-timers. 
Trading  of  equities  were  among  a  few  large  institutions  with  very  little 
participation from others. The feeling of  “control” was there and the markets 
were “cornered” and had overshot their fundamental values on the downside. As 
their confidence grew, the springs were coiled and the markets were depressed 
with artificial strength through more leverage. The bets got larger and when this 
group  stopped  trading,  the  depressed  springs  would  uncoil  and  the  markets 
would spring up with tremendous upward force. However, not all markets can 
behave this way as those that had their springs damaged could not shoot up as 
much. Markets with spring mechanism working would finally have their glitters 
back but markets with failed mechanisms will have to live with them until the 
springs are fixed and functioning again. 
Recently, the highly leveraged funds were hurt badly from the Russian crisis. 
The banks had to enforce margin calls and Asian markets moved up with “de-
leverage”  activities.  As  the  Russian  crisis  erupted  with  attention  focused 
elsewhere rather than Asia, and when Hong Kong Government started to buy 
Hong  Kong  shares,  together  with  Malaysia  imposing  capital  controls,  most 
markets returned to normal as leveraged funds were hurt.  
There are implications here for short-term and long-term investment strategies. 
While it is too early to infer any permanent change in the correlations, there are 
concerns regarding diversification across markets and instruments. It could be 
shown  that  the  currencies  and  bond  markets  behaved  the  same  way  as  most 
funds seek refuge in the US treasury bills, thus causing the yields to drop and 
USD  to  appreciate  even  further.  One  can  successfully  implement  investment   31 
strategies using trade-timing models that have superior performance based on 
correlation data. However, any discussions of Quant models here are beyond the 
scope of this paper and pursued elsewhere. 
11. Discussions 
With the markets moving in tandem with correlations as high as 0.9, it is difficult 
to  diversify  as  there  are  few  instruments  that  move  in  opposite  directions. 
Meantime,  fund  managers  may  have  to  resort  to  techniques  to  hedge  their 
position or risk losing more capital or redemptions. The long-term funds have 
now got to focus on capital protection, rather than to seek positive returns. The 
following discussions attempt to shed some light on the development of hedge 
funds techniques that have wide implications. 
(i) Hedge Funds Investment Styles and Regulations 
To  understand  the  rationale  and  importance  of  correlations  in  the  present 
context, it is essential to understand the workings of the different style of hedge 
funds. Discussions of different styles can be found in Lederman and Klein (1995). 
One particular style, market-neutral investing, has been responsible for most of 
the significant innovations in portfolio management for the 1990’s. The market-
neutral strategy has been introduced as early as1949 by A.W. Jones investment 
partnership, sometimes referred to as the first hedge fund (Lederman and Klein 
(1996)). This 50 years old “new” money management approach, also known as 
zero  investment  approach,  is  used  to  produce  returns  independent  of  capital 
markets systematic risk. 
The basic market-neutral strategy starts with one dollar of capital, purchases a 
long position on an asset, and sells another short. The cash proceeds from the 
short sale are invested to produce a return that approximates the risk-free rate.   32 
In effect, the return to the strategy is the sum of two alphas, one each from the 
long  and  short  portfolio.  With  leverage,  alpha  multiples  of  40  to  50  can  be 
achieved.  
Within the framework the capital asset pricing model, market-neutral portfolios 
have  a  zero  beta.  In  fixed-income  strategies,  market-neutral  investing  can  be 
described as zero-duration investing. Market neutral encompasses a whole range 
of so-called relative value techniques and arbitrage within and across assets that 
owes  its  returns  largely  to  a  fund  manager’s  skill  in  hedging  and  spotting 
inefficiencies. 
In practice, leverage is limited by credit providers for all classes of securities, 
except  equities  in  US.  In  US  equities,  Regulation  “T”  defines  the  maximum 
leverage and applies to customer accounts. In the case of 50% or 2:1 maximum 
leverage,  one  can  have  a  long  and  a  short  for  one-dollar  of  capital.  In  the 
unregulated  fixed  income  market,  leverage  is  negotiated  between  the  broker-
dealers credit or margin department. In US equities, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulations allow broker-dealers’ long/short equity accounts 
to attain leverage ratios of 6.29 to 1. 
According  to  White  (1996),  “Leverage  of  20:1  in  convertible  bonds  can  be 
achieved.  In  foreign  equity  markets,  “contracts  for  differences”  with  local 
investment banks allow the attainment of equity long/short leverage ratios of up 
to  10:1,  depending  on  the  strategy  and  the  overall  creditworthiness  of  the 
borrower.” 
One way to leverage further within US is for an institutional investor to set up 
passive broker-dealers, partly to avoid taxation, partly to take advantage of the 
more advantageous net capital rules applied to exchange members and broker-  33 
dealers. In 1995, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued IRB1995-4 #29 
revenue  ruling  that  long/short  investing  does  not  create  unrelated  business 
taxable income (UBTI), clearing the path for long-term and pension funds such 
as Universities, Pension Plans and Charitable Remainder Trusts to enter into 
market-neutral management mandates. 
We have argued that it is the degree of leverage that has to be regulated and this 
involved not only hedge funds, but also unregulated derivatives trading. With 
this in mind, we now have an idea how large capital flows have evolved. 
What are the implications for investment in Asia? In Asia, it is now easier for 
fund managers to initiate a short position by borrowing scrips from offshore. It 
may sound ironic, but it is crucial that fund managers managing investment in 
Asia be allowed to have facilities to do short-selling in order to protect against 
falling  assets  values.  Many  Asian  shareholders  cannot  sell  shares  due  to 
moratorium or to retain control. Short selling should be allowed and regulated, 
provided  leverage  is  regulated  tightly.  Regulations  that  promote,  rather  than 
prohibit short selling as in the case of Malaysia, should be adopted. Otherwise, 
investors in these countries risk losing more of their capital as the facilities are 
not available to them in their own countries. 
The  other  concern  about  regulations  involves  rating  agencies.  As  most  funds 
cannot hold on to the assets or currencies as their ratings fall below designated 
level, such as investment grade for bonds, they have to sell with no regards to the 
price  level  at  the  next  re-balancing  exercise.  This  suggests  that  the  role  of  a 
rating agency is important too and it raises the issue of whether there should be 
international regulations for rating agencies. Any downgrade of assets is a signal 
to short sell an asset and that causes huge reverse flows of capital.   34 
(ii) Capital Flows and Leverage 
Large capital flows would return after each short period of recess, as perhaps the 
most significant in the hedge fund industry is the recovery of arbitrage styles a 
few months after the collapse of LTCM. The performance fees for LTCM in the 
last  quarter  was  USD  50m,  just  a  couple  of  months  after  the  16-institutions 
bailout. Many arbitrage strategies use corporate bonds, treasury bonds, or both, 
with corporate typically representing long positions and Treasury bonds being 
held as short positions. During the period of “flight to quality”, hedge funds and 
proprietary desks were hurt as money flowed into Treasury bonds, bidding up 
prices. On the other hand, corporate bonds were sold, depressing prices. It was a 
double blow to the hedge funds. Their long position in corporate bonds was hurt, 
together  with  their  short  position  in  the  safer  treasury  bonds.  Banks  started 
reducing  their  exposures  and  that  worsened  the  positions  of  hedge  funds, 
prompting US Federal Reserve Board (Fed) to act so that further de-leverages 
would not occur. 
Since the beginning of Nov 1998, increased confidence and demand for corporate 
bonds  pushed  up  prices  while  treasury  bonds  prices  moved  in  the  opposite 
direction.  The  “flight  to  quality”  disparity  in  values  between  corporate  and 
Treasuries was generally viewed as a historical anomaly that had not occurred 
for decades. The implication will likely be that “market neutral” strategies are 
again safe havens, and that spells trouble for economies. It has been said that the 
storm has passed and new hedge funds continue to spring up like mushrooms 
after a hard rain. Investment into hedge funds, both institutional and private, 
continues  to  grow.  More  research  on  the  curb  of  leverage,  and  international 
capital flows, need to be done.    35 
It is clear now that it is not the hedge funds that caused the storm, it is the 
leverage of the hedge funds and large unregulated institutions that aggravated 
the Asian crisis. Financial firms and investors will move their money offshore if 
the US or another country goes forward with new rules on its own for derivatives 
or  hedge  funds.  International  coordination  is  crucial  to  regulate  the  leverage 
aspects of hedge funds and unregulated over-the-counter derivatives. Clearly, 
once regulation is in place in a single country, it may threaten the legality of 
many investments and chase the market offshore. It is arguable whether a single 
financial  regulator  for  the  world  is  feasible,  but  at  least  some  international 
regulatory coordination is possible. 
The financial flu had spread beyond Asia to Russia and Latin America. Some 
argue  that  imposing  some  kind  of  involuntary  debt  rescheduling  and  capital 
controls in the affected countries can contain the crisis. Others argue that hastily 
designed and heavy handed attempt to keep private creditors in one country 
could  send  more  capital  fleeing  from  other  countries,  and  might  well  have 
further reduced the pool of financing for emerging markets. Whatever it is, the 
enormous  volume  of  capital  flows  in  relation  to  the  limited  resources  made 
available to international institutions is an important issue to address. 
On 4
 Feb 1999, Malaysia’s Finance Minister Tun Daim Zainuddin announced 
Malaysia’s new graduated exit tax on the repatriation of portfolio capital and 
profits. The original capital bought in before 15 Feb 1999 can be repatriated 
subject to a graduated levy between 30% and 10% based on the duration of 
investment. For Malaysia, life seemed to have returned to normal.  
For hedge funds too, at least, life is back to normal. But for others, “Nightmare 
at the Periphery: Part II”, could just have begun and the world is not ready for   36 
it. Furthermore, we are not sure how long the deflation of the rest of the world 
can continue to subsidize the phenomenon of asset inflation in the U.S.. If Soros’s 
prediction is right, then the centre would eventually be affected very badly when 
the bubble bursts. Our results clearly suggest that it would also be wise for US to 
impose policy to slow down the outflows of capital to the periphery. It is not so 
much whether the capital should flow from the centre back to the periphery, but 
the speed that matters. In the long-term, US capital outflows are good for both 
the centre and the periphery, but not when all capital outflows happen all at 
once. The consequence of that is disastrous and has prompted the call for the 
establishment of an International Credit Insurance Corporation by Soros (1998) 
due to the failures of Bretton Woods Institutions, namely IMF and World Bank, 
in instilling confidence in the emerging markets.  
The continued outflow of capital from U.S. to Japan forces many fund managers 
to re-balance their portfolios in favour of Japan and that is good. In terms of 
market  capitalisation  in  March  1999,  US  accounts  for  over  half  (USD12.23 
billion) of the world market (USD24.02 billion). Japan is now the third largest 
with  only  7.3%  (USD1.8Billion),  behind  UK  with  9.28%  (USD2.35  billion)  of 
global capitalisation. As long as the Japanese equity market continues to be on 
an uptrend with gradual re-distribution of capital from the U.S., the probability 
of a rapid exit of capital is reduced. 
12. Conclusion 
Time series can be viewed to have two components, a long memory component 
and a short memory component. Using the tools from long range dependence 
literature, we have inferred that there is a case for some control measures for 
reverse capital flows from the periphery to the centre. The use of semiparametric   37 
techniques can identify series with long memory. These series have memories 
and what happened previously, though seen to have no effects visually, do have 
some influence in the future. To put it simply, with long memory, the pendulum 
may  not  have  been  broken  and  become  a  wrecking  ball  causing  damages  to 
economies. Market mechanism is still working, with market swinging to one end, 
and then swinging back in due course.  
Our results suggest that there is a case for interventions in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Hong Kong. In particular, Indonesia has a stronger case than Malaysia to 
impose some controls to slow reverse capital flows. This is because these markets 
do behave like a wrecking ball, causing enormous damage to the economies when 
shocks  hit.  The  flows  have  to  be  blocked,  as  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the 
markets would return to its trend. 
It  is  perhaps  too  early  to  conclude  that  capital  controls  have  worked  for 
Malaysia, but preliminary evidence has been encouraging. Of course, any short-
term benefits would have its long-term costs but so far the costs seemed to be 
minimal. It takes time to build the new financial architecture, which requires 
consensus and concerted efforts.  
We have also shown that the financial flu is contagious and an Asian portfolio is 
not diversified unless one is allowed to invest in instruments that move against 
the markets and have negative correlations. There are few such instruments and 
one  may  have  to  resort  to  hedge  fund  techniques  such  as  market  neutral  to 
protect the capital and hopefully enhance investment yields. In an era where 
large  capital  flows  are  caused  by  highly  leveraged  funds  and  herd-behaviour 
with the rapid flow of information through the information highway, “new” and 
“innovative”  investment  techniques  that  protect  capital  and  promise  superior   38 
performance would evolve. Finally, to prevent a “Nightmare on Wall Street”, US 
may  have  to  control  the  outflows  of  capital  and  the  Fed  has  acted  quite 
successfully  through  influencing  the  expectations  of  interest  rates.  Inherently 
unstable  financial  markets  need  supervision  and  regulation,  especially  in  the 
area of leverage by hedge funds and trading desks of large institutions. Whether 
a new international financial authority would eventually emerge and in what 
form is a future area of research. Meantime, we leave it to individual countries to 
fend for themselves. To prevent a global meltdown, the world would have to act 
fast. 
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